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JUDGE GINSBURG:  Good afternoon.  Welcome 
back.  This panel is on “All Things Vertical.”  We 
will probably accommodate only some things vertical, 
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The order you see at the table here is not 
necessarily the order in which we’re going to proceed.  
We’re going to hear first from Jean-François Bellis 
about the Directorate-General for Competition’s (DG-
Comp) recent activities under Article 101; then from 
President de Silva of the Autorité of France; from 
Advocate General Nils Wahl; and from Jeff Bank, who 
will try to bring some of this together, looking at 
trends. 
Without any further delay, we will turn to 
you, Jean-François. 
MR. BELLIS:  Thank you.  I will speak about 
the Commission and DG-Comp’s recent activities.  But, 
after having presented a historical summary of how 
vertical restraints have been handled by the 
Commission, as you will hear, I have the impression 
that in fact we are going back to the 1960s when the 
policy was developed when you look at the most recent 
decision taken by the Commission in this area. 
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a major role in the development of European 
competition law.  In the 1960s the Commission decided 
to put competition law at the service of a higher 
policy, or I would even say political objective, 
market integration when it decided that any 
distribution agreement that partitioned the Common 
Market should be illegal. 
In order to force companies to act 
consistently with that policy, they developed this 
very interesting definition of what is a restriction 
of competition: “Any restriction on the freedom of 
action of a party is a restriction of competition” 
coming within the prohibition of Paragraph 1 of what 
was then Article 85, now Article 101. 
For example, an exclusive-dealing agreement 
in which a manufacturer would undertake not to appoint 
other distributors in the exclusive territory was an 
agreement which contained a restriction of competition 
that came under the prohibition of Paragraph 1 of 
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exempted by the Commission. 
That very broad interpretation of Paragraph 
1 of Article 101 was not shared by the Court of 
Justice in its early case law. 
But this did not deter the Commission from 
applying this interpretation.  Why?  Because at the 
time the Commission had a monopoly over exemptions, 
and any agreement which fell under the prohibition of 
Paragraph 1 of Article 101 needed to be notified to 
the Commission, and exemption could only operate from 
the date of notification. 
This put the Commission in the position of 
being the final arbiter of what clauses a distribution 
agreement could validly contain.  So the Commission 
decreed that, for example, in exclusive-dealing 
agreements the manufacturer could prohibit a dealer 
from engaging in active sales outside its territory 
but not passive sales. 
For selective distribution agreements these 
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qualitative and applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.  
The dealers could be prohibited from selling to 
dealers outside the selective distribution network but 
should be allowed to sell to consumers anywhere. 
For franchise agreements there was a list of 
clauses that these agreements could contain, but the 
common feature of the Commission’s policy with respect 
to all forms of distribution was that resale price 
maintenance (RPM) was always prohibited. 
Of course, with this broad interpretation of 
Paragraph 1 of Article 101 there was an avalanche of 
notifications.  When you look at the number of the 
cases handled by the Commission — I think that now the 
Commission is at around 40,000 — more than 30,000 of 
those originated in the 1960s when the Commission 
developed that policy. 
To deal with this avalanche of notifications 
the Commission developed a unique new instrument 
called the Block Exemption Regulation, in which it 
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agreements. 
The Commission over the years adopted a 
growing number of such regulations, developing — 
something which I think was done by no other 
competition authority in the world — a catalog of 
clauses: some black, which meant prevented the grant 
of the exemption; some white, which were consistent 
with the exemption; and then there were some 
intermediate clauses, the gray clauses. 
This gave European competition law this very 
unique and strange physiognomy, that of an antitrust 
law.  A significant part of it consisted in these 
catalogs of clauses, which were legal or illegal 
depending upon their content but with no consideration 
whatsoever of the effect on the market of the 
agreements in which they were included.  It looked 
more like a law of abusive contractual clauses than a 
real antitrust law. 
That was the situation from the 1960s until 
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tired of enforcing such a system and launched the 
modernization revolution.  It was a revolution because 
the notification-and-exemption system was abandoned.  
The Commission also abandoned its monopoly over 
individual exemptions but retained the power to issue 
block exemptions. 
It’s also recognized that economic analysis 
should play a role in the assessment of 
anticompetitive practices.  It also admitted that it 
had spent too much time focusing on vertical 
restraints and should direct its attention to 
practices which actually restrict more competition, 
such as cartels. 
One could say that it took more than twenty, 
twenty-five years for some of the Chicago School ideas 
finally to reach Brussels.  But I say only some of the 
Chicago School ideas because the Commission did not 
abolish the block exemptions, which is strange because 
the block exemption was needed because there was such 
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101. 
For vertical restraints the Commission 
consolidated all the block exemptions for specific 
agreements into one exemption with a streamlined list 
of black clauses, which still included restriction on 
sales, on resales, on passive sales, exclusive-dealing 
agreements, and RPM. 
Since the Commission was now accepting the 
idea that an economic analysis should be conducted 
before finding a given practice illegal, it has 
complemented the Vertical Restraints Block Exemption 
Regulation with Vertical Guidelines.  These are very 
interesting documents because in those Guidelines the 
Commission explains how economic analysis should be 
applied to assist the anticompetitive effect of a 
given vertical restraint. 
Very interestingly, for example, in 2010 
when the Commission updated the Vertical Restraints 
Block Exemption Regulation and extended it for twelve 
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Guidelines in which it made it clear that what are 
called “hardcore restrictions” — which are the old 
list of black clauses which are now called “Article 
restrictions” — in fact was not like a per se rule.  
Practices such as RPM, for example, or a ban on 
passive sales could be permissible when a new product 
is launched or an existing product is introduced into 
a new market, or a franchise launches a short-term 
promotional campaign. 
Very interesting ideas, but ideas which the 
Commission never applied itself because from 2004 
until in fact a few weeks ago the Commission stopped 
adopting decisions on vertical restraints.  All its 
decisions practically concern cartels.  Enforcement of 
vertical restraints was left to the Member State 
competition authorities with the Commission limiting 
its intervention to amicus curiae briefs in cases 
before national courts. 
This policy of what might be called “benign 
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e-commerce inquiry.  In 2015 the Commission launched a 
sector inquiry into e-commerce.  That inquiry was 
completed last year, and the Commission identified a 
number of practices which in its view impeded the 
proper functioning of an EU Digital Single Market, 
such as territorial restrictions, like geoblocking and 
a few other practices. 
As is common when the Commission conducts a 
sector inquiry, a number of cases have followed.  I 
will prepare a paper which will be included in the 
proceedings of this conference in which I list twenty-
two investigations which were launched in the last 
two-and-a-half years which are really the follow-up of 
the e-commerce sector inquiry. 
The majority of those cases deal with 
territorial restrictions, especially geoblocking, 
restrictions on online sales, and also RPM.  In fact, 
the first decision which is the product of this 
resurgence of interest in vertical restraints by the 
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manufacturers in the consumer electronics industry, 
and it’s a case dealing with resale price maintenance.  
The decision hasn’t been published yet; there is only 
a press release and a statement by the Commissioner. 
This is a case in which fines were imposed 
through a new procedure that the Commission has 
developed, a kind of informal settlement procedure in 
which the companies agree on the level of the fine, 
and this will produce probably decisions with very 
little reasoning. 
The question is: Is the protection of the 
single market again going to be the master of the 
enforcement of European competition law on vertical 
restraints?  The question is:  Are we going to go back 
to the 1960s with a very formalistic approach that 
certain practices are illegal regardless of their 
impact on the market? 
In these recent cases on RPM there is a hint 
that there might be a horizontal aspect to those cases 
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Commissioner said that the practices which consisted 
apparently in the manufacturers taking action against 
online retailers which were charging the lowest prices 
could also have a broader horizontal impact because 
apparently those low prices influenced the results of 
the pricing algorithms and price-comparison websites 
which were used by all the retailers to set their 
pricing.  But we have to see when the decision is 
published exactly what role this played in the 
analysis. 
All of this comes at a time after fourteen 
years in which the Member States have applied the 
European competition law on vertical restraints.  We 
see divergences between the Member States, with 
Germany specifically taking the hardest line on those 
cases and other Member States, such as, for example, 
the Netherlands, taking a very different approach. 
This is not a new phenomenon.  There have 
always been divergences in the national competition 






Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
since the modernization and the regulation that 
modernization produced, Regulation 1/2003, national 
competition law has in effect become EU competition 
law, which explains all those references for a 
preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice on what 
are, in fact, national competition cases. 
We have now in Europe a competition law on 
vertical restraints which is going in many different 
directions, and it will be interesting to see what 
will be done to ensure that those divergences are 
reduced, and also that what was the main achievement 
of modernization, the use of economic analysis, is not 
lost in the process. 
I will stop here. 
JUDGE GINSBURG:  Thank you, Jean-François.  
President de Silva? 
MS. de SILVA:  Hello to everyone.  I am very 
pleased to be in New York City, so thank you to 
Fordham University for inviting me.  I think that this 
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issues. 
I think one of the reasons we chose this 
topic for today is that there is a global renewed 
interest in vertical relations.  I think that some of 
the issues I will be alluding to now are quite 
different from those that Jean-François tackled that 
were restriction-in-distribution agreements. 
I think that there are some legitimate 
questions that have been raised: What exactly are 
agencies looking at in terms of vertical issues; is it 
a real issue?  The second question is, what are the 
special difficulties in assessing those risks?  
Finally, is it something that you should look at more 
in specific sectors — for example, in the digital 
economy — or is vertical something that you look at in 
any type of sector, any type of merger? 
Maybe a quick reminder about the analytical 
framework.  I think that there is a consensus that in 
terms of the theoretic principles that are being 
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There was a very interesting study led by 
the International Competition Network (ICN) quite 
recently that interrogated a number of agencies.  What 
they found is that most national competition 
authorities intervened in the last few years in terms 
of vertical competition issues, at least in one 
vertical merger in the last few years. 
Still, what is interesting also is that 
those interventions in terms of vertical competition 
issues are quite rare.  It is only one among ten of 
those interventions, so we can imagine that horizontal 
issues are more common. 
Second, this report by the ICN shows that 
there is a very consistent approach by the national 
competition authorities in terms of what they’re 
looking at when they are assessing, for example, 
vertical mergers.  They are looking at customer 
foreclosure theories of harm.  They are looking at 
ability, incentive, and effect.  They are looking at 
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example, what will be the effect upstream and 
downstream, and what are the efficiencies?  I think, 
at the least, we are discussing a lot about frameworks 
on digital, but in terms of general concepts in 
vertical the thing seems pretty clear. 
It is also quite common that vertical issues 
are deemed to be more complex than horizontal issues.  
This is something I will try to illustrate by two 
examples. 
I wanted also to say that when we talked 
about vertical issues in Delhi at the ICN meeting 
there was an interesting remark by Andrea Coscelli 
from the UK Competition and Markets Authority saying 
that in those types of vertical issues it’s quite 
difficult to quantify and to have a very sound and 
perfect economic analysis, so you must look at all 
types of different information, look at the market, 
and really try to understand how the market is 
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The first example is a very classic case now 
in France concerning the media sector.  This is 
related to a very big merger that happened some years 
ago between Canal+ and TPS, the very big pay-TV 
broadcasters, and a free-to-watch TV group called 
Direct 8. 
There was when those mergers happened a very 
thorough analysis because the agency felt there were 
some very big risks in terms of vertical relation 
because this new entity that was being created could 
harm the other independent channels, for example, that 
were trying to be broadcast on pay TV or satellite TV, 
and so the power of this new entity could create a 
barrier for them to be able to reach distribution.  
This is the type of worry that we had when we looked 
at the merger. 
This led to a very complex decision with a 
lot of commitments in terms of trying to prevent those 
risks, for example, by defining the ways the channels 
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detailed commitments to make sure that they would 
still be able to access broadcasting at an accessible 
price, for example. 
There was also a very big risk perceived in 
terms of access to movie rights, for example, or 
premium broadcasting rights in the sport sector.  This 
very complex set of rules was put into place for many 
years. 
Last year we looked anew at this set of 
commitments, and we did a thorough review of the 
market of broadcasting and pay TV.  What we found is 
that the market had really changed enormously in the 
last five years. 
To give you a few examples of the new 
elements that we saw, I think one of the biggest 
factors was the fact that now you have Netflix; you 
have over-the-top (OTT) new actors like Amazon that 
are able to distribute some content over the Internet 
and not on your classical TV.  Really the landscape 
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This led us to really change in depth all 
those commitments that had been in place for five 
years.  This led to a very lengthy and complex 
analysis that lasted almost a year, which is a lot of 
time, and really was quite labor-intensive for the 
agency because we had to look at all the elements of 
the market. 
What can we draw from that?   
The first point is that you don’t have that 
many cases involving complex vertical relations, but 
when they happen they can be very labor-intensive for 
the agency and also for all the undertakings involved 
because you have a number of markets to take into 
account.  Often the effect on competition is not quite 
as clearcut as you have on horizontal issues.  You 
need to factor in a lot of different elements. 
The second question: In the end can you say 
that the remedies were effective, the remedies that 
had been in place for five years; did we over-enforce 
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difficult to answer that question. 
What we can say is that we saw that there 
was a possibility for new effective competitors to 
arrive in the market.  You only need to say “Netflix” 
or “Amazon” to see that now you have very new 
competitors. 
Also, we were quite keen on preventing any 
type of barrier to innovation on technology.  We saw 
that there have been huge innovations with the OTT and 
Netflix and the fact that now you tend to look at TV 
on your smartphone and not on your TV set at home.  We 
can at least say that the market has been able to 
change and we have seen new competitors arriving, 
which is a good thing. 
The second example I would like to address 
now in terms of vertical relation is the food industry 
and agriculture because I think it’s a very good 
example of looking at upstream and downstream effects 
on competition. 
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important issue in terms of competition analysis but 
even in terms of political issues and debates in 
Parliament. 
What is the problem at the beginning?  The 
problem is that in France, like in many countries, the 
food retailers are quite powerful and they have some 
strong competition on price to the customer.  Also, 
they have some very animated discussions when they 
negotiate prices with the food industry.  I think this 
is something that happens in many countries. 
Why it became a political issue is that 
there is this idea that is being diffused in France 
that because of those vertical relationships the 
farmers and the food industry are suffering because 
the food retailers are too strong, too concentrated, 
or they are too hard negotiating the prices. 
There is also the idea that the customers 
may be losing in the end because they don’t get such 
good products because the food industry is suffering 
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diversity in product. 
This has led us to a series of interventions 
in terms of the competition agency, and at the same 
time a very strong series of initiatives by the 
Parliament in terms of organizing those vertical 
relations.  I will give you only a few examples. 
For many years in France — and this is 
something that is not common in many countries — there 
has been specific legislation that says how you are 
going to negotiate the prices for the food retail 
industry.  You are not free to discuss any way you 
like; you have to negotiate at a certain time of the 
year; you have limits in terms of how low the prices 
can be, for example; and the whole idea is that this 
is going to protect farmers and the agricultural 
industry. 
There was a new big change and debate 
starting in 2014 because those big food retailers 
started negotiating buying alliances together.  This 
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percent of the French market. 
At this stage, the agency was asked to give 
an opinion on whether this was going to have 
undesirable effects upstream and downstream.  For the 
consumers was there a risk that they were getting 
lower-quality products?  Were the producers, farming 
and the food industry, they suffering because of those 
relationships? 
This led in 2015 to a new law being applied 
through the agency that led us to have some new powers 
when looking at those alliances.  There is a specific 
obligation to notify those buying alliances to the 
competition agency, which has two months to look at 
them. 
This is something a little bit intermediate 
because this is not a real approval like you have in a 
merger regime.  But still we are supposed to look at 
those agreements and say that if there is a 
competitive issue, then the company should change the 
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But this was not perceived to be enough, so 
in 2017 and 2018 there was a new movement of alliances 
with ever-stronger concentration, and also a new trend 
that now you have international buying alliances.  
That means, for example, if you are Coca-Cola and you 
want to be distributed by Carrefour in France and in 
Brazil, Carrefour is going to negotiate with you an 
overall alliance for all over the world and for 
specific regional areas. 
This led to a new political debate led by 
the government and also to new activity in Parliament, 
and the result of this was that there was a new change 
to the competition regime.  This gave the agency new 
powers, and now we are able to impose some interim 
measures specific to those buying alliances if we see 
a possible harm to competition.  This is going to 
change again the legal framework of those buying 
alliances. 
But this is not the end yet because we 
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chief of the investigation in the French agency — that 
we should also look at those buying alliances in terms 
of antitrust infringement of alliances that are being 
put into place.  At the same time, the law should be 
approved in the next few days, and there is going to 
be an antitrust investigation to look at those 
agreements to see if they have an adverse effect on 
the market as a whole and the quality of the product 
and in the end the product that the customer gets to 
eat. 
Maybe some general lessons that we can draw 
on those vertical issues have been trying to show, I 
think, that verticals are at the center of the most 
difficult topics for us but very sensitive and 
important topics.  These are topics that we need to 
address. 
At the same time, they are quite complex.  
In the investigation I was alluding to, the Rapporteur 
General of the Authority asked for information from 
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asking, “Have you been in effect harmed by those 
relationships and negotiations with the distributors?” 
This is going to be needed to gather a lot 
of data and to also have a very thorough economic 
analysis to see if we can in the end conclude that 
those agreements are anticompetitive.  I think that 
this is going to be in the next few months another 
issue that is going to be quite important for us. 
Thank you very much. 
JUDGE GINSBURG:  Thank you.   
Advocate General Wahl? 
MR. WAHL:  I think it’s fair to say that 
vertical restraints was not a subject that anyone 
dealt with at the Court of Justice for a good number 
of years.  If you wanted to read about it in legal 
journals, you wouldn’t find any up-to-date article. 
Why was that so?  I don’t really know.  It 
could be as Jean-François said, but I think everything 
has changed with the exponential growth of e-commerce.  
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context what I’m going to speak about really.  I’m 
going to speak about a case called Coty Germany. 
In its Final Report on the e-Commerce Sector 
Inquiry, which the Commission published in May 2017, 
the Commission highlighted some structural changes 
that e-commerce had brought to many markets.   
As far as relevance for our subject, the 
Commission said there was more frequent use of 
selected distribution system by manufacturers and, 
more generally, a larger number of vertical restraints 
in distribution contracts, and in the Commission’s 
view that phenomenon could raise a number of issues — 
some new, some perhaps less — from the angle of EU 
competition law.   
To name but a few of these contractual 
clauses the Commission regarded as potentially 
requiring deeper scrutiny: as Jean-François said, 
geoblocking and geofiltering; requirements to set up a 
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No major action was undertaken by the 
Commission.  In fact, the Commission said nothing 
needs to be done with regard to the vertical group 
exemption and that that should not be revised before 
2020.  But, on the other hand, no binding decision 
from the Commission saw the light in the aftermath of 
the sector inquiry. 
As also said before, national competition 
authorities were a lot more active in this field.  A 
particularity of them took action against so-called 
“parity clauses” that are used by certain hotel 
reservation platforms, such as Booking.com, etc., but 
most of the proceedings were finally settled as the 
companies concerned accepted to change their practices 
and narrowed the scope of those clauses. 
In some jurisdictions the authorities went 
further and required more radical changes.  The 
Commission acted only later by investing similar 
restrictions in the e-book market, and that procedure, 
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From that perspective it is not really 
surprising that not very many cases came before the 
Court of Justice that involved vertical restraints.  
With the exception of the case that I’m going to talk 
about, Coty Germany, none of those cases actually 
raised anything of interest, to be honest. 
Before going into the Coty Germany case I 
also need to menton the situation before this 
particular case.  Already in 2011 the Court of Justice 
had decided a case called Pierre Fabre Dermo-
Cosmétique.   
In that case a manufacturer had put an 
explicit ban on selling over the Internet for all its 
selected distributors of cosmetics.  The Court of 
Justice in this particular case actually said that 
that was a restriction of competition by object: 
selling cosmetics was not good enough to have a 
selective distribution system, selling cosmetics was 
not as such protected by the so-called Metro criteria; 
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show anything; it was simply restrictive of 
competition. 
In some jurisdictions — and I think by some 
commentators — this was taken as an indication that 
now the Court of Justice was going to go back and say 
that the approach to vertical restraints would be a 
lot more strict than before.  I’m sure one could have 
different opinions on that, but it is my view that 
that was in fact the reason why the situation came up 
in Coty Germany. 
Let me go back to what Coty Germany was all 
about.  The facts of the case I think were fairly 
simple.   
Coty Germany is a manufacturer of luxury 
cosmetics and perfumes and it has concluded several 
selective distributorships, one with a company called 
Parfümerie Akzente.  In these selective 
distributorships the distributors were required to 
respect and protect the luxury image of the products 
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to sell the products over the Internet using 
discernible third-party platforms.  Internet sales 
could only be effectuated by using their own 
platforms, which should be designed in a certain way 
to give the appearance of luxury.  In essence, this 
meant a total ban on using platforms such as Amazon 
and the like. 
Parfümerie Akzente did not accept this 
clause, and when Coty Germany tried to enforce it 
before the lower court, Coty actually lost the case.  
The national court in that case simply said it 
considered the clause to be anticompetitive and it 
could not benefit from any kind of exemption.  It is 
interesting to note that the national court actually 
made explicit reference to the Pierre Fabre case as 
support for its judgment. 
Well, why give up in the court of first 
instance?  You appeal, obviously.  So Coty Germany did 
appeal, and the regional court posed a preliminary 
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four preliminary questions. 
The first issue was in fact whether the 
protection of the brand image of a product is a 
legitimate requirement that justifies the setting up a 
selective distribution system. 
The second issue was whether an online 
marketplace ban amounts to “restriction of competition 
by object” within the meaning of now Article 101, and 
by the same token whether or not it would be a 
hardcore restriction within the meaning of the 
Vertical Restraints Block Exemption Regulation. 
I think it’s fair to say that some of the 
Court’s pronouncements in this Coty judgment have been 
a focus for debate on what the Court actually said and 
what it did not say.  For that reason, I was planning 
on simply saying how I see what the Court actually 
said, and then to complement the picture I’ll simply 
give my opinion of what it did not say. 
As regards the first question, the Court of 
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of Metro I, which is the mother of all vertical cases 
in EU law from 1977, are fulfilled, a restraint aimed 
at preserving the image of a product is presumptively 
lawful.  In other words, it falls outside the scope of 
Article 101.  This is a big thing.  It’s not even 
anticompetitive to begin with and you can get an 
exemption; it simply falls totally outside.   
The Court said in Paragraph 24 of the 
judgment: “The organization of a selective 
distribution network is not prohibited by Article 101 
to the extent that resellers are chosen on the basis 
of objective criteria of a qualitative nature, laid 
down uniformly for all potential resellers, and not 
applied in a discriminatory fashion, that the 
characteristics of the product in question necessitate 
such a network in order to preserve its quality and 
ensure its proper use, and finally that they do not go 
beyond what is necessary.” 
The interesting part is that the 
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“necessitate” such a network.  That was the whole 
thing in Coty. 
Here it’s important to emphasize that firms 
do not compete only on price but also, inter alia, on 
quality and innovation.   
In my view, it is plainly irrelevant to 
argue that online marketplaces intensify price 
competition among retailers.  I don’t think it can be 
disputed that while restricting intrabrand price 
competition selective distribution systems promote 
interbrand competition in other parameters, they 
encourage producers to compete on the quality of their 
products and they provide incentives for retailers to 
improve the shopping experience of end-users.   
Why would a restraint that is known to have 
such positive benefits or effects be restricted by 
object?   
I tried to summarize this in my opinion that 
I wrote in this particular case.  I said, for example, 
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whether there is restriction of competition is not so 
much the intrinsic properties of the goods in 
question, but rather the fact that it seems necessary 
in order to preserve the proper functioning of the 
distribution system, which is specifically intended to 
preserve the brand image or the image of quality of 
the contract goods.” 
To me, actually I think this is supported by 
another case from the Court of Justice, a case from 
2009, called Copad, where the Court ruled that a 
trademark licensor can invoke its right to prevent a 
licensee from selling to nonmembers of a selected 
distribution system.  I think that ruling is based on 
the key premise that if companies cannot protect their 
intangible property — that is, brand name, trademark, 
goodwill, what have you — when dealing with third 
parties, they will refrain from licensing and from 
selling via independent distributions. 
So why would EU law penalize firms that sell 
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produce in-house?  Copad and Coty, in my view, suggest 
that EU law is indifferent about the distribution 
model that companies use.  There is no reason why 
vertical integration should be favored over licensing 
or selling via third parties, and there are many good 
reasons why the latter should not be treated more 
strictly. 
Just by answering the first question I think 
the Court finally put an end to the interpretation of 
the Pierre Fabre judgment.  Before Coty some 
commentators argued that Pierre Fabre suggested that 
the protection of the prestigious image of a product 
is not a legitimate requirement justifying the sorts 
of restraints found in the selective distribution 
system. 
The Court, however, in this case clearly 
said that the Pierre Fabre ruling is confined to the 
specific circumstances of that case.  I can always 
say, like in the discussion we had before lunch, that 
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all the time.  It will be written away in a gradual 
manner.  They will not refer to Pierre Fabre again in 
my view, not in that sense anyway. 
The second question concerned the actual ban 
on using third-party platforms.  The Court here, 
because it was a preliminary reference, first pointed 
out that it is for the referring court to decide this; 
but when deciding it they should keep in mind that the 
contractual clause in their view had the objective of 
“preserving the image of luxury and the prestige of 
the goods at issue” and the clause was “objective and 
uniformly applied without discrimination to all 
authorized distributors.” 
The prohibition imposed by a supplier of 
luxury goods on its authorized distributors to use 
third-party platforms for the Internet sale of those 
goods was also, according to the Court, “appropriate 
to preserve the luxury image of those goods” and 
everything in their view was proportionate. 
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fourth questions because the Court dealt with them 
together.   
The third question was basically: to what 
extent was a restriction like the one in question a 
hardcore restriction according to the Vertical 
Restraints Block Exemption Regulation?  The Court 
simply said, “No, it is not.” 
If that’s what the Court said, what did it 
not say? 
Here I think it cannot be inferred from the 
judgment that the Court’s findings are limited to the 
distribution of luxury goods.  The purpose of a 
selective distribution system is procompetitive 
effects independent of the nature of the products at 
issue.  Trademark law, for that matter, seeks to 
protect all producers, not only producers of luxury 
goods.  In my view, there’s no reason why EU 
competition law should be different. 
I don’t think one could say that the Coty 
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of opinion on that — to luxury goods.  It is clear 
that the Court of Justice in its answer to the 
national court spoke about luxury goods the whole 
time.  The reason for that is simple: it concerned 
luxury products.  But I don’t think the reasoning in 
itself is limited to it.  That is one contentious 
question that has to be dealt with. 
Second, which is also kind of interesting 
but on the other perspective, is the fact that the 
Court only dealt with one thing, namely whether or not 
luxury products could be used in selective 
distribution systems and whether or not that 
marketplace ban was okay.  It didn’t concern anything 
else.  Therefore, Jean-François’ idea that there will 
be more cases is clearly correct. 
This was one case, a small case, but I think 
it was important.  What was important really was that 
it confirmed the normal rules that we had before in 
vertical restraints.  That means that the Pierre Fabre 
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Thank you very much. 
JUDGE GINSBURG:  Thank you.   
Jeff Bank, you have the task of reporting 
from the United States single-handedly. 
MR. BANK:  Easy enough.  Thank you. 
I’ll start by stating the obvious, but I 
think it does confirm that there is convergence 
between the European Union and the United States on a 
lot of these points.  Vertical arrangements in the 
United States, whether conduct or merger, raise more 
questions than we have answers for right now.  They 
are extremely complex, they are different than 
horizontal restraints, and the tools that we have for 
assessing vertical restraints need to be different. 
I think it’s fair to say that in the United 
States we now recognize that vertical restraints 
perhaps can do more competitive harm than previously 
thought, at least as the thinking went from the 1970s 







Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
But the question now is: Should they be 
assessed in a manner similar to the analyses done for 
horizontal restraints?  What sorts of presumptions 
should we make about vertical restraints and vertical 
arrangements?  As President de Silva noted, what are 
the right tests to use, quantitative and qualitative 
tests?  What effects should we look at and focus on? 
I think in the United States we have 
somewhat more guidance on conduct cases than merger 
cases.  We’ve simply had more conduct cases, 
especially recently. 
But I think about this from a client 
perspective, and when a client comes to me and asks me 
about an exclusive arrangement that they want to enter 
into, the answer is almost always, “It depends.”  
That’s just not good enough. 
I think it’s worth recounting a little bit 
of the history in the United States, although it 
somewhat mirrors the history in the European Union. 
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generally policed vigorously.  RPMs, exclusive 
arrangements, rebates, dealer limitations — all of 
these were subject to liability findings in the courts 
and by enforcers.  The Court in Brown Shoe, a very 
famous merger case, found there was vertical harm.1 
Then, as in the European Union, the Chicago 
School of Economics viewpoints started to trickle in 
and enforcement of vertical restraints and mergers 
decreased — particularly after courts acknowledged 
that such vertical arrangements could be pro-
competitive in the Sylvania case2 on the conduct side 
and the Hammermill Paper case3 on the merger side.  It 
showed that the pendulum was swinging to the other end 
of the spectrum. 
From the early to mid-1970s until the mid-
to-late 1990s vertical restraints were essentially 
ignored by the antitrust enforcers, plaintiffs, 
courts, etc. 
                                                 
1 Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
2 Continental Television Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
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I think then a split started that in the 
United States continues to today.  This may be 
somewhat divergent from the European Union.  
Horizontal restraints were, of course, inherently 
suspect, but vertical restraints were not. 
Perhaps due to the influence of the Chicago 
School view, for vertical restraints, whether conduct 
or merger, efficiencies were assumed to be greater 
than any anticompetitive harm.  There was little 
analysis done on a merger-specific basis or a conduct-
specific basis.  It was simply assumed that if the 
arrangement in question was vertical then the 
efficiencies would be greater than any harm. 
In the late 1990s there was a sea change as 
a result of the Microsoft decision.4  It provided a, 
perhaps not new but a more straightforward, framework 
for analyzing some of this type of conduct.   
In the last eighteen to twenty years or so 
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we’ve seen much more nuanced analyses in the United 
States of vertical restraints.  There are new 
quantitative tools that have been proposed by 
economists and academics.  There are new simulation 
tools available, both on the merger front and on the 
conduct front, to estimate what the effects will be if 
certain conduct is allowed to continue or if a merger 
is allowed to go forward. 
There has also been an increase in 
qualitative evidence.  As email and digital 
communications have proliferated, it becomes a little 
bit easier for enforcers and courts to better 
understand exactly why an actor undertakes certain 
conduct or why a party wants to enter into a certain 
transaction.  Such evidence can better demonstrate 
intent, but I think it also can help courts and 
enforcers better understand the potential effects. 
I think it’s fair to say that right now in 
the United States vertical arrangements, conduct or 
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there have been significant liability findings in 
recent years.  Bundling, exclusive dealing, rebates — 
courts have found all of these to be unlawful in 
certain circumstances. 
Of course, the LePage’s decision,5 Dentsply,6 
Meritor,7 and McWane8 are some of the big ones; there’s 
the consent decree with Intel.9  It shows the courts 
are taking seriously the threat of vertical restraints 
and trying to weigh the procompetitive benefits of 
those restraints and arrangements versus the 
anticompetitive effects. 
It is still unclear under exactly which 
circumstances vertical conduct or mergers are 
prohibited or should be prohibited and what the right 
tests are.  Should we look at whether an action raises 
a rival’s costs?  Should we look at output?  Should we 
look at price?  Should we look at whether certain 
                                                 
5 LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003).  
6 United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005). 
7 ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp, 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012). 
8 McWane, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 783 F.3d 814 (2015).       
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conduct results in pricing below cost?  Should we look 
at whether an entity is sacrificing short-term profit 
to knock out a rival?  All of these are potential 
tests, and there is really no answer at the moment as 
to which test we should look at. 
I think this does lead to the recognition 
that the United States and the European Union may end 
up with the same result when determining whether a 
vertical restraint should be permitted, but the 
jurisdictions probably begin from a different starting 
point.  As I said, the United States tends to look at 
vertical restraints and vertical arrangements as not 
being inherently suspect, whereas I think that’s not 
quite the case in the European Union.  But, I think 
the Intel decision in the EU shows that the analysis 
is perhaps getting more nuanced there and closer to 
how a US court might view the issues.10  Certainly the 
Coty Germany11 decision is in line with some recent 
                                                 
10 Intel Corp. v European Commission, [2017] Case C-413/14 E.C.R. I ___ 
(Delivered September 6, 2017). 
11 Coty Germany GmbH v. Parfümerie Akzente GmbH, Case C-320/16, [2017] E.C.R. 
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decisions in the United States, like the Leegin 
decision.12  So there is room for convergence, but 
we’re not quite there yet. 
President de Silva noted that there are 
certain sectors on which enforcers are more focused.  
I don’t think that’s necessarily the case in the US.  
There is certainly no explicitly stated goal like that 
in the United States.  However, certainly on the 
merger front, as I’ll talk about in a second, 
technology and media platforms have generated a lot of 
interest in the last ten years or so. 
Let me turn to mergers.  In the United 
States the history of vertical merger enforcement has 
somewhat tracked the history of conduct enforcement, 
albeit with many fewer decisions and fewer actions 
taken. 
AT&T/Time Warner was the first litigated 
merger in the United States in forty years.13  There 
have only been about twenty-two or so challenges to 
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vertical mergers in the United States since 2000.  You 
can contrast that against the challenges to horizontal 
mergers.  There are about thirty to forty per year.  
Vertical mergers have not been at the front of the 
mind for the enforcers, but I think they are growing 
in importance. 
Let me talk about AT&T/Time Warner for a 
couple of minutes.14  There — I’m sure you all know – 
the DOJ alleged that the combination would allow the 
new entity to harm rivals in three different ways 
primarily. 
The first was that the merger would give the 
new entity leverage to extract higher prices for 
content provided by Time Warner.  To the extent that a 
rival distributor didn’t end up purchasing the Time 
Warner content, or to the extent there was a blackout 
and that rival lost customers, well, those customers 
would just move over to DirecTV, and AT&T would profit 
anyway.  That was, I think, the primary concern by the 
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DOJ. 
The second was a concern that the new entity 
would be able to coordinate more easily with Comcast, 
one of the other major distributors, or to act 
unilaterally to play gatekeeper and restrict certain 
must-have content from rivals.  In particular, there 
was concern about competition with some of the virtual 
distributors who are themselves vertically aligned, 
like Netflix, like Amazon, like Hulu, who have the 
ability to reach consumers in new ways.  But of 
course, if Netflix, Hulu, and Amazon don’t have access 
to some of the must-have content that Time Warner was 
creating, those rivals could be harmed, and the DOJ 
was concerned about that. 
Third and last, the DOJ was concerned and 
alleged that the new entity would be able to prevent 
its competitors from using certain content like Game 
of Thrones to promote and market its own system to 
consumers. 







Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
Of course, as you all know, the court 
rejected the DOJ’s contentions and their economic 
analysis in an almost 200-page opinion.  The case is 
now going up on appeal, although the merger has 
closed. 
I think it’s significant, however, to note 
that the decision is very fact-specific, and we’ll 
have to see if it has any precedential value going 
forward.  Of course, an appellate decision is probably 
more likely to have precedential value for future 
mergers, but it is significant to have a decision on a 
vertical merger.  We haven’t had one in forty years. 
Of the challenged vertical mergers in the 
last twenty years, almost all of have been approved 
with either structural or behavioral conditions.  Let 
me give you some examples.  Google/ITA, in which 
Google was required to license certain technology to 
travel intermediaries.15  There were deals entered into 
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firewalls were set up to prevent the wrongful sharing 
of information with Coke and Pepsi by the bottlers.16  
There was the AMC merger where both structural and 
behavioral conditions were applied; there were 
divestitures required and firewalls set up.17  Other 
deals have been abandoned when challenged, including 
the Comcast/Time Warner merger a few years ago.18 
I think, given the lack of precedent here 
and given the lack of jurisprudence, and given the 
lack of Vertical Merger Guidelines put out by the 
agencies in the United States, which I’ll talk about 
in a second, it’s very difficult to extract clear 
guidance for clients.  Of course, I keep coming back 
                                                                                                                                     
15 Final Judgment, United States v. Google and ITA Software, Inc., 1:11-CV-
00688 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2011), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-
document/file/497636/download. 
16 See Decision and Order, In the Matter of The Coca-Cola Company, No. C-4305 
(Nov. 5, 2010), available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/101-0107/coca-cola-company-matter; Decision and Order, In the 
Matter of PepsiCo, Inc., No. C-4301 (Sept. 28, 2010), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/091-0133/pepsico-inc-
matter.  
17 Final Judgment, United States v. AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc. and 
Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 1:16-CV-02475 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2017), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/955041/download. 
18 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Comcast Corporation Abandons 
Proposed Acquisition of Time Warner Cable After Justice Department and the 
Federal Communications Commission Informed Parties of Concerns (Apr. 24, 








Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
to that, but that is my job, and it’s very difficult 
to counsel clients without the guidance there. 
I will note, however, that there has been an 
explicit shift, stated by the DOJ at least, to favor 
structural remedies over behavioral remedies.  DOJ 
officials have recently given a number of speeches 
noting the difficulties in monitoring behavioral 
conditions for mergers, and I think it’s fair to say 
that over the next few years we will likely see 
mergers, at least when approved by the DOJ, more often 
approved with structural conditions rather than 
behavioral conditions. 
Finally, how best to assess verticals, and 
where do we go from here?   
One question is: Will the AT&T loss make the 
DOJ more cautious and/or will it make them more likely 
to accept behavioral conditions on mergers?  
Disney/Fox was just approved with a structural 
condition; Disney was required to divest certain 
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sports networks; there were no behavioral conditions 
applied.19 
I think — this is just my opinion — 
companies will become more aggressive in terms of 
vertical mergers because of the AT&T decision, but I 
don’t see the DOJ backing down either, and certainly 
we have a number of potential vertical mergers and 
vertical restraints coming up in front of the DOJ, 
including some in the healthcare field.  I know there 
have been some rumors over the past couple of days 
about those and we’ll see where those go in terms of 
what, if any, conditions are applied. 
A second question is: How do we measure and 
consider the speed of innovation and emerging 
technology?  Comcast/NBC was similar to AT&T/Time 
Warner, but Comcast and NBC abandoned their merger, 
while AT&T and Time Warner decided to challenge DOJ’s 
                                                 
19 Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. The Walt Disney Company and 
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opposition. The additional competition from vertically 
aligned virtual distributors changes the competitive 
dynamics; President de Silva noted this also.  With 
Netflix and Hulu and Amazon changing the landscape, I 
think the enforcers and courts are going to have to 
figure out how to deal with that. 
Last, I’ll ask the question: Is it time to 
revise the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the 
United States?  They were last revised in 1984.  There 
is a lot of debate about this out there; there are 
reasons to do it and reasons not to.  But it might 
provide an opportunity for the United States to align 
itself with the European Union, which more recently 
revised their Guidelines. 
Thank you. 
JUDGE GINSBURG:  Thank you, Jeff.   
I want to throw something out on the table 
and then we’ll ask if there are some cross-comments, 
but very briefly because we want to leave some time 
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What I find surprising in some of this is 
that the empirical literature — none of which was 
available when Bork or Posner were first writing — has 
been so lopsided in favor of vertical restraints.  
This is not dealing with mergers. 
There are twenty-some studies that uniformly 
come to the conclusion that the particular industry or 
restraint investigated was procompetitive.  There is a 
meta study by Francine Lafontaine, who was Chief 
Economist for the FTC, and Margaret Slade, in which 
they found 85 percent of all the vertical restraints 
across these studies were procompetitive.  That still 
leave you with “it depends” because there’s that 15 
percent, or whatever it really is, so it’s not per se 
one way or another.   
But it does strike me as surprising that 
there is any kind of resurgence of interest in 
vertical restraints that have been the subject of 
these kinds of studies, these contractual restraints 
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By the way, I have remained silent on 
AT&T/Time Warner.  The appeal is in my court.  I don’t 
know whether I will be on the case, I don’t know 
whether I want to be on the case, but I have no choice 
one way or another. 
Any cross-comments briefly before we turn to 
the audience? 
MR. BELLIS:  A brief comment about Coty.  
I’m very concerned about how Coty will be applied by 
national courts and national competition authorities.  
One week after the Coty Court of Justice judgment, a 
judge in Germany found that ASICS sport shoes were not 
a luxury product and would not qualify.  But the 
previous year in the Netherlands Nike shoes were 
considered to be a luxury product.  You have antitrust 
law and are reduced to discussions about whether a 
shoe is a luxury product or not.  I personally find 
that pathetic. 
But there is a problem.  A lot of people 
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manufacturer in how its product reaches the consumer 
survives the sale of the product to dealers.  These 
are seen as restrictions of competition which should 
be put in a box, exempted, restriction by object or 
not.  I think it’s a very limited analysis which 
doesn’t really take into account the broader consensus 
that these restraints normally do not restrict 
competition. 
JUDGE GINSBURG:  President de Silva? 
MS. de SILVA:  I want to underline how 
interesting it is to see this excellent overview of 
the American antitrust landscape in terms of verticals 
to see that we might have some convergence on the 
general approach. 
The first point I want to make is: What is 
the attitude of the Court in terms of this type of 
problem?  We have a recent decision where the Court 
decided not to follow the DOJ.   
In the case I was mentioning about the 
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remedies – the only thing that they changed in the 
Authority’s decision — felt that the remedies were not 
going far enough to protect potential vertical effects 
on the market, and so they decided that the decision 
should be even more rich in terms of remedies.  That’s 
one case in which the Court deemed really that the 
vertical competition issues were so serious that the 
agency should have gone even further.  That’s 
interesting to take into account. 
Also, I wanted to react to the very 
interesting debate about behavioral remedies with 
respect to structural remedies.  We’ve been hearing 
with interest what Makan has been saying the last few 
months.  We are having an internal discussion about 
those subjects, and we will be issuing a report making 
an analysis of behavioral remedies.  What can we say 
about those?  Are they effective in terms of the 
issues that we need to tackle? 
Of course, we all agree that structural 
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obvious.  Still, in some cases it’s not easy to find 
even a structural remedy, and you don’t want maybe to 
go too far.   
I think there is a real tradeoff between 
behavioral and structural remedies, and this is going 
to be one of the important topics in the next few 
months in France, and maybe in Europe. 
MR. WAHL:  If I understood you correctly, 
are we talking about one can have a point of view 
saying that vertical restraints are nonproblematic 
from a competition perspective but there are still 
some parts that might be problematic? 
To me, I’m sort of hung up on Coty Germany.  
I beg your pardon for that.  I see that as an 
acknowledgment of going back to the idea that in fact 
85 percent is positive; it’s procompetitive. 
But they are not simply given carte blanche 
to do anything.  They do limit it to that particular 
clause and sort of, “Come back and ask us more on the 
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First of all, it’s inherent in the style of 
the Court not to answer more than they’re asked, but 
even so it is an opening for not saying that 
everything is gravy.  Something is good, and that 
particular thing was good.  Let’s see what the rest 
have to do. 
JUDGE GINSBURG:  It took us from 1977, when 
our Supreme Court said territorial restraints were not 
anticompetitive, until 2010, when it said RPM was not 
anticompetitive.  It was a long time coming. 
Questions from the audience?  We have time 
for a few, and we may be able to borrow a few minutes 
from the break.  Question time.  Over there.  Oh, 
James. 
MR. KEYTE [off-mic]:  Do you think there is 
going to be a distinction drawn as this plays out 
between price-related vertical restraints and 
nonprice-related vertical restraints: price-related 
because you have the real risk of false positives – 
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although that can be a subject — versus nonprice, 
where you might get into some more clear guidance with 
respect to this?  It actually comes out of Intel as 
well, in terms of the length of the restriction, the 
foreclosing type of restriction.  Do you see some 
clarity coming from that potential fork? 
JUDGE GINSBURG:  That was the sequence in 
the United States.   
What do you expect in Europe? 
MR. BELLIS:  Intel, of course, again talking 
about boxes, we put it in a different box, the box of 
abuses, exclusionary conduct.  The discussion that we 
had here was a discussion which was more about Article 
101, so it’s not abuses of dominance. 
Price-related and nonprice-related 
restraints thus far have been put in the same box as 
hardcore restrictions.  I think they will continue to 
be viewed with great suspicion by competition 
authorities and courts. 






Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
Vertical Guidelines to define that some of the Article 
restrictions, including RPM, could be seen as 
exemptible.  I remember that the Commission officials 
who were in charge of drafting those Guidelines 
expressly said that they were paying attention to the 
discussions in the United States about Leegin, but all 
they were prepared to accept in those Guidelines was 
very limited use of those clauses in exceptional 
circumstances.  So not the broad treatment of those 
restrictions, as we’re coming now under the rule of 
reason rather than the perceived prohibition that you 
find in the United States. 
I think that in Europe indeed vertical 
restraints continue to be seen very negatively.  I 
think that the Commission tried to stay away from that 
area for a long time, but it has kept the block 
exemption, which is based on the presumption that 
these arrangements are a violation of competition law.  
So I think it will take a long time to reach 
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Europe. 
JUDGE GINSBURG:  We have time for one more. 
QUESTION [Andreas Mundt, 
Bundeskartellamt][off-mic]:  Andreas Mundt from the 
Federal Cartel Office.   
I think it’s not a secret that we were among 
those who were a bit worried about the Coty judgment 
because what we see today in our agency — and it may 
be the same in other agencies in Europe — is we have 
received a lot of complaints from small dealers who 
are prevented from selling online by the 
manufacturers.  As a result or a consequence of the 
Coty judgment, we have a very broad movement by 
manufacturers in Germany to exclude smaller dealers 
from selling their products via third-party platforms.  
That is a natural consequence. 
We were always worried that if the Coty 
judgment comes as it did, in the very end we wouldn’t 
have had three parties maybe that were able to sell 
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found in the Internet; that would be the huge 
platforms, like Amazon, that of course are always 
found by the consumer; and there might be very large 
dealers, third dealers, who are found, too. 
But what happens to the small ones?  Don’t 
we see a reduction of the competitive process if we 
exclude those from dealing online? 
All the more, we saw from the sector inquiry 
from the European Commission on e-commerce that as far 
as Germany is concerned 65 percent of the dealers said 
that selling via a third-party platform was vital for 
that and that they could not be found with their own 
Internet shop if they didn’t have the access to these 
huge platforms. 
That is our concern that we have, a broad 
limitation of the competitive process, since a great 
deal of dealers might not be found on the Internet 
anymore, and that will reduce competition to a small 
group of those large enough to be found on the 
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As I said, since we receive a great many 
complaints today that exactly this is happening, does 
that play a role?  Is that seen?  Or do you think that 
is a German specificity of the Federal 
Bundeskartellamt? 
JUDGE GINSBURG:  It was a U.S. concern in 
the 1930s but not very recently.  This is intrabrand 
competition you’re talking about. 
MR. BELLIS:  Indeed, this is a very old 
issue.  It’s paradoxical, and I understand of course 
the concern.  There is a concern of protecting the 
small dealer and to allow him to sell its products on 
Amazon, the platform which eventually may put the 
dealer and all its competitors out of business anyway.  
I understand it’s a difficult issue, but should 
competition law be applied to protect the dealers 
regardless of the broader impact of the practice of 
competition? 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Mundt][off-mic]:  It’s not 
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great many dealers, you also reduce the choice for the 
consumer, where he can buy his product and at which 
price.  So it’s not about protecting certain 
companies.  It’s not about protecting small companies.  
It’s about reducing the choice for the consumer.  I 
think that is a different issue. 
QUESTION [Alexander Riesenkampff, University 
of Freiburg Law School][off-mic]:  That’s a restraint 
of competition. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Mundt][off-mic]:  That is a 
restraint of competition.  I’m just trying to fuel 
your debate. 
MS. de SILVA:  I just want to make a remark 
about this debate about Coty.  It’s true that many 
lawyers have questions from their clients, and I am 
quite impressed by the number of questions that remain 
after Coty or the other questions that the Court 
didn’t have to decide because it was not what was 
being asked of the Court at that time. 
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companies because the issue of e-commerce is, of 
course, completely vital for many companies today, and 
there is this uncertainty in some cases about how can 
you translate what the Court said about different 
products.  For example, that’s one of the questions 
you alluded to.  What about other types of 
restrictions that are not in the scope of the Court? 
Maybe this can lead us to some thoughts 
about legal certainty: What are the ways to achieve 
better legal certainty on those matters, and is it 
possible?   
But I’m really impressed by the fact that 
before the Coty decision there were lots of 
conferences dealing with it, but there are almost as 
many conferences and debates after the decision. 
JUDGE GINSBURG:  I think the last word goes 
to the Advocate General. 
MR. WAHL:  I simply think that it’s 
important to remember — and I think that was the point 
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important, but it’s not the whole thing; there is 
competition in other parameters, too. 
It is sort of self-regulating because what 
Coty Germany, the company, is doing is in fact trying 
to sell more, to increase interbrand competition by 
limiting intrabrand competition. 
I don’t see your concern about choice.  That 
presupposes that there are different groups of 
customers, one going along with the platforms, one 
going for platforms and individual, and one going for 
the individual.  There are no such indications in the 
sector inquiry, for example, and I don’t think there 
is anything in that. 
But I do acknowledge that the situation is 
different in different countries.  I know the 
situation is clearly different in Germany. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Mundt][off-mic]:  That’s the 
point. 
MR. WAHL:  To be honest, I haven’t really 
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different.   
Just as a twist, I heard because when I was 
at a seminar in Düsseldorf that apparently Coty 
Germany, the mother company, now has started selling 
on Amazon for some reason or another.  I don’t know 
why. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Mundt][off-mic]:  I wonder 
if all this has to be taken into account because these 
are all new questions that have not been answered by 
the Coty judgment.  
MR. WAHL:  What is taken into account in the 
judgment was what was put forward before the Court. 
JUDGE GINSBURG:  For this very reason we 
must reconvene in a couple of years and pick up from 
where we are now. 
Please join me in thanking the panel. 
MR. KEYTE:  So let’s take fifteen minutes, 
and then we’ll have the health care panel.  Thank you. 
[Adjourned:  3:08 p.m.] 
